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scouting for approval: Lessons  
on Medical device regulation in an era  
of crowdfunding from scanadu’s “scout”
CoLLeen smith*
i. intRoDUCtion
In November of 2012, Scanadu, an up-and-coming medical device company based in 
Mountain View, California, introduced the world to the Scout.1 The Scout is a “hockey 
puck-shaped device” that Scanadu says is capable of measuring a multitude of vital signs, 
including temperature, heart rate, respiratory rate, and oxygen levels in the blood.2 To 
use the Scout, a consumer simply places the Scout to her temple for ten seconds.3 The 
Scout collects and sends the measurements to the consumer’s cell phone via Bluetooth 
LE, and the information is analyzed and tracked through a companion smartphone 
application.4 Scanadu is also developing two accessories for the device: the ScanaFlu, 
an influenza tester, and the ScanaFlo, a urinalysis device.5
In May of 2013, to fund the Scout’s commercial development, Scanadu launched a 
crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo,6 one of the world’s most popular crowdfunding 
websites.7 Crowdfunding, an increasingly popular method of raising capital, is the 
process of raising money for a project, usually via the Internet, by obtaining many small 
contributions from a large number of people.8 In just two hours, Scanadu passed its goal 
* Colleen Smith is a J.D. candidate, class of 2015, at William & Mary Law School. She plans to practice 
food and drug law at Covington & Burling’s Washington, DC office after completing a federal clerkship. This 
article was submitted to the 2014 H. Thomas Austern Memorial Writing Competition. It was selected for and 
awarded the first place prize for the long paper category.
1 Press Release: Scanadu Aims to Empower Patients with DIY Vital Signs Device, sCanadu (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://www.scanadu.com/pr/scanadu-aims-to-empower-patients-with-diy-vital-signs-device/. 
2 Matt Brian, Scanadu Scout ‘Medical Tricorder’ for Smartphones Breaks Crowdfunding Record, verge 
(July 23, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/23/4548336/scanadu-scout-health-tracking-smartphone-
accessory-record.
3 Mike Flacy, Scanadu Scout Makes Star Trek’s Medical Tricorder a Reality, digital trends (May 
23, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gadgets/scanadu-scout-makes-star-treks-medical-tricorder-a-
reality/#ixzz2l4Fy1hZ0.
4 Id. 
5 Jonah Comstock, Scanadu to Crowdfund Its Tricorder Device Pre-FDA Clearance, mobiHealtHnews 
(May 22, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/22516/scanadu-to-crowdfund-its-tricorder-device-pre-fda-
clearance/.
6 Brian, supra note 2.
7 Chance Barnett, Donation-Based Crowdfunding Sites: Kickstarter vs. Indiegogo, forbes (Sept. 9, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/09/donation-based-crowdfunding-sites-kickstarter-
vs-indiegogo/.
8 Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right 
Crowd, 29 J. bus. venturing 585, 586 (2014).
            Vol. 70210 Food and drug Law JournaL
of raising $100,000.9 Over the course of its thirty-day campaign, Scanadu raised—a 
then Indiegogo record—$1.66 million from 8,500 contributors.10 
Scanadu used the most prevalent crowdfunding model for its campaign: the pre-
purchase model.11 The pre-purchase model enables contributors to “pre-order” whatever 
product the crowdfunder is trying develop for commercial sale in exchange for a financial 
contribution.12 In this case, contributors to Scanadu’s campaign “bought” the prototype 
of the Scout.13 Scanadu’s campaign site advertised that it expected to ship the prototype 
of the Scout to contributors by March of 201414 and hoped to make the Scout available 
to the general public in early 2015.15 There is, however, one major hurdle that stands 
in Scanadu’s way on its quest to bring the Scout to market: FDA approval.
Scanadu has acknowledged that FDA will need to approve the Scout before it is 
made available to the public.16 A company seeking to sell a medical device in the 
United States has to obtain FDA approval before it can sell, distribute, or even market 
the device.17 To gain approval, Scanadu will have to conduct clinical trials, and those 
trials will have to demonstrate the efficacy of the device.18 Scanadu tried to subvert 
this requirement and, in violation of FDA regulations, made the prototype of the Scout 
available to consumers prior to FDA approval by stating in its crowdfunding campaign 
materials that the prototype of the Scout “is not a medical device and makes no medical 
claims.” 19 Instead, Scanadu pronounced that the Scout was a “research tool” that “can 
be used to collect data that will be submitted in a marketing application to the regulatory 
authorities.”20 Scanadu used its crowdfunding campaign not only to raise money, but 
also to acquire individuals willing to participate in its clinical trials; Scanadu gave all 
campaign contributors who will be receiving the Scout the option to participate in its 
trials.21 
It should be no surprise that Scanadu turned to crowdfunding as a primary source 
of capital. Hundreds of other companies and individual entrepreneurs have done the 
same thing over the past few years, many with great success.22 The business world 
is utilizing crowdfunding more and more partly because it offers advantages beyond 
9 Brian, supra note 2.
10 Id. 
11 Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. bus. venturing 1, 3 
(2014).
12 Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding 2 (Fraunhofer Inst. for Sys. and Innovation Research 
ISI, Working Paper No. R2, 2011).
13 Scanadu Scout, indiegogo, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/scanadu-scout (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015).
14 Id. 
15 Brian, supra note 2. 
16 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13 (explaining in its crowdfunding campaign materials that Scanadu will 
“still have to file with the FDA”).
17 See infra Part III.A.
18 See infra Part III.B.
19 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13 (“The exploratory version of the Scanadu Scout™ is not a medical 
device and makes no medical claims. It is still in development and can only be used as part of an investigation. 
As an investigational product, it can be used to collect certain data and must be used in accordance with the 
study’s protocol.”).
20 Scanadu Scout, the First Medical Tricorder, gobaCkers, http://www.gobackers.com/projects/
scanadu-scout-the-first-medical-tricorder/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., massolution, 2013Cf: tHe Crowdfunding industry report (2013), available at http://
www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/2013cf-the-crowdfunding-industry-report/25107. 
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simply providing a cash-strapped company with the means to get off the ground.23 On 
average, it costs medical device companies tens of millions of dollars to run clinical 
trials and pay for an application for FDA approval.24 Accordingly, the federal regulation 
of medical devices functions as an almost insurmountable barrier to market entry; 
without a means to enter the U.S. market, innovation is quashed and companies are 
driven to countries with easier market entry.25 Crowdfunding can be invaluable to a 
small medical device company that is struggling to attract investors, not only because it 
provides access to much-needed start-up capital, but also because it offers many other 
benefits, including consumer feedback in the early stages of development, which this 
Article will later explain.26
Because Internet crowdfunding is a relatively new method of raising capital, there 
is limited academic literature on the subject. The majority of legal scholarship on 
crowdfunding focuses on the equity model of crowdfunding and its interaction with 
federal securities laws.27 As its name implies, using the equity model, “crowdfunders 
invest money in order to receive ownership interests in a company.”28 In addition, 
past authors have scrutinized medical device regulations and proposed improvements 
for their flaws.29 However, this Article’s focus on the interaction of these two subject 
areas—medical device regulation and crowdfunding—raises issues novel to the world 
of legal literature.
This Article will argue that medical device companies should be able to utilize 
crowdfunding to raise the necessary capital to develop a product. However, because of 
the risks medical devices pose, any solution that allows medical device companies to 
employ crowdfunding should ensure the continuing commitment to consumer safety that 
is at the core of FDA regulation. This Article uses the Scanadu Scout as an example and 
a staring point for evaluating the use of crowdfunding in the medical device industry. 
This Article explains how and why Scanadu broke the law when it moved the Scout, an 
“adulterated or misbranded” medical device, through interstate commerce in violation 
23 Jenna Wortham, Start-Ups Look to the Crowd, n.y. times (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/30/technology/kickstarter-sets-off-financing-rush-for-a-watch-not-yet-made.html?.
24 JosH makower et al., fda impaCt on u.s. mediCal teCHnology innovation: a survey of over 
200 mediCal teCHnology Companies 7 (2010), available at http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/
FDA%20impact%20on%20U.S.%20Medical%20Technology%20Innovation.pdf.
25 See Christina Farr, Entrepreneurs Say the FDA Is Killing Medical Innovation, venturebeat (Apr. 
30, 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/30/stifled-by-regulation-entrepreneurs-take-life-saving-devices-
overseas/; see also Andrew Pollack, Medical Treatment, Out of Reach, n.y. times (Feb. 9, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/business/10device.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that many companies 
are choosing to sell their products in countries such as Mexico, Canada, Brazil, India, China, and all over 
Europe, but not the United States, because these countries have less stringent, and thus less expensive, medical 
device regulations); Henry I. Miller, U.S. Medical Device Industry in Critical Condition, forbes (July 24, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/2013/07/24/u-s-medical-device-industry-in-critical-condition/ 
(“[M]any device firms are shutting down or moving abroad to take advantage of the more favorable tax and 
regulatory climate in Europe.”).
26 See infra Part II.A.
27 See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 
64 fla. l. rev. 1433 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 tenn. l. rev. 879 (2011); David Mashburn, Comment, 
The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 emory 
L.J. 127 (2013); John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and 
Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 vand. J. ent. & teCH. l. 583, 589 (2013).
28 Wroldsen, supra note 27, at 589.
29 See, e.g., Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: 
The Need for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HealtH matrix 441 (2007).
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of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). This Note goes on to explain what this means for other medical 
device companies looking to copy Scanadu’s strategy. 
Part II of this Article begins with an explanation of crowdfunding, its origins, and a 
description of the four different crowdfunding models. Part II also describes the many 
benefits of crowdfunding and why the medical device industry would profit from them. 
Part III provides some historical context for FDA’s regulation of medical devices 
and examines the modern structure of the regulations, including how medical devices 
are classified and the different hurdles companies face when trying to bring a medical 
device to market. 
Part IV first explains how, by giving all campaign contributors the option of 
participating in the Scout’s clinical trials, Scanadu created two different groups of 
consumers—the non-participants and the participants. Part IV.A analyzes 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(a) and explains how and why Scanadu’s actions, in regard to the non-participants, 
were a violation of this code section. Using Scanadu’s strategy as a starting point, this Part 
looks at how a medical device company can use crowdfunding legally. Specifically, this 
Part explains that if a device company wants to use the pre-purchase model, consumers 
should be able to “pre-order” a device prior to FDA approval, but should not be able 
to receive the product until after the device has received FDA approval. This section 
looks at Biosense, a company that is using this permissible strategy. 
Part IV.B analyzes Scanadu’s actions in regard to the group of contributors who 
opted to participate in the Scout’s clinical trials. This Part argues FDA should not 
give campaign contributors the option to participate in clinical trials as a “perk” for 
backing the product, and the investors and test subjects should remain separate. This 
Part reasons that permitting the overlap of these two groups creates a moral hazard that 
may ultimately affect the safety and efficacy of the device.
Section V argues that FDA should adopt and enforce guidelines for crowdfunding 
that reflect the principles outlined in this Article. Additionally, this Part argues that 
FDA should promulgate regulations that prevent crowdfunding websites from allowing 
medical devices to be crowdfunded using a pre-purchase model without following FDA 
guidelines. This Part explains that FDA has limited resources to police medical device 
companies while crowdfunding sites have gatekeepers that review every application 
to execute a crowdfunding campaign. By adopting this policy, FDA will gain an ally 
in its effort to protect consumers.
ii. An intRoDUCtion to CRowDfUnDinG
Crowdfunding is a new and exciting way for undercapitalized companies and 
individuals to fund their ideas. This Part provides some background on crowdfunding, 
explains the four prevalent models of crowdfunding, and explains why, due to the recent 
drop in investment in medical device development, crowdfunding is a particularly 
attractive option for device companies. 
Crowdfunding is the practice of asking for money to fund a specific goal, generally 
through a website dedicated to crowdfunding, from anyone who will listen. 30 Individuals 
and businesses alike use crowdfunding to raise money for a vast array of things: to 
produce a movie, develop a new gadget, or support a charity.31 Although crowdfunding is 
not an entirely new concept,32 the advent of websites dedicated to crowdfunding has given 
30 Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 586.
31 Wortham, supra note 23.
32 For more information on the history of crowdfunding, see The History of Crowdfunding, fundable, 
http://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101/history-of-crowdfunding (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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life to this alternative means of finance.33 An ever-expanding group of entrepreneurs 
and charities are utilizing crowdfunding in a vast number of sectors.34 Crowdfunders 
worldwide raised $2.7 billion dollars in 2012 through more than 1.1 million campaigns; 
this was an 81% increase from 2011.35 This fast-growing trend promises to change how 
our society apportions investment capital.36
An individual or company seeking to utilize crowdfunding (“crowdfunder”) must first 
have a project or product for which to raise money.37 The crowdfunder then selects one 
of the many websites dedicated to crowdfunding,38 also called “CF platforms,” through 
which to hold their crowdfunding campaign.39 CF platforms allow crowdfunders to 
develop a profile page containing information about the project and its creators, photos, 
videos, dates of the campaign, fundraising goal, and the crowdfunding model, including 
any rewards for contributing.40 Many CF platforms have an “all-or-nothing” policy 
meaning if a campaigner does not reach its stated fundraising goal it does not receive 
any of the contributed funds.41 If the campaigner reaches its goal, the CF platform 
usually keeps a percentage of the money raised as a fee.42 When the campaign ends, 
the funds are transferred directly from contributors’ credit cards to the crowdfunder’s 
account.43 Finally, the crowdfunder is obligated to fulfill the rewards, if any, it promised 
to contributors.44
A. Why Crowdfund?
Crowdfunding offers benefits that many other forms of financing do not. It is 
particularly attractive for small and/or new companies that typically struggle to raise 
33 Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, soC. media wk. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://
socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowdfunding/#.Un6NNhZ5nzJ.
34 Ajay K. Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, The Geography of Crowdfunding 4 (2011) 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) (citing kevin lawton & dan marom, 
tHe Crowdfunding revolution: soCial networking meets venture finanCing (2010)), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w16820.pdf. 
35 massolution, supra note 22.
36 See Castrataro, supra note 33; see also kevin lawton & dan marom, tHe Crowdfunding revolution: 
soCial networking meets venture finanCing (2010). 
37 Creator Handbook: Getting Started, kiCkstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/
getting_started (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
38 Individuals or companies can also crowdfund on their own, using their own website or other platform 
to garner contributions from a crowd of people. lawton & marom, supra note 36.
39 See Hemer, supra note 12, at 15.
40 See Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy?, forbes (Nov. 27, 
2012) http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-
the-economy/; see also Creator Handbook: Funding, kiCkstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
handbook/funding (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
41 Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, kiCkstarter, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/
kickstarter+basics?ref=faq_nav#Kick (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
42 For example, Kickstarter’s fee is five percent of all money raised in crowdfunding campaigns on its 
site, while Indiegogo takes four percent of all money raised. Id.; Fees and Pricing, indiegogo, http://support.
indiegogo.com/entries/20492953-fees-pricing (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
43 For example, Indiegogo transfers funds into the fundraiser’s PayPal account. Indiegogo Playbook: 
After Your Campaign, indiegogo, https://go.indiegogo.com/playbook/life-cycle-phase/finishing-strong (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015). Kickstarter transfers money into the fundraiser’s Amazon Payments account. Creator 
Questions: Getting Started, kiCkstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015).
44 Indiegogo Playbook: After Your Campaign, supra note 43; Creator Handbook: Rewards, kiCkstarter, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/rewards (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
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capital through traditional means.45 Crowdfunding is quickly becoming a main source 
of “seed financing” for small entrepreneurs because the process is simple, easy to 
understand, and financially safe.46 CF platforms provide an additional advantage for 
financially inexperienced entrepreneurs.47 These sites, such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo, 
give crowdfunders a platform to sell themselves and their project and provide access 
to potential investors.48 Many CF platforms offer other valuable fundraising services 
to help crowdfunders run successful campaigns. For example, some sites “give advice, 
organize public relations, [and] make arrangements with micro-payment providers.”49
For example, a crowdfunding campaign acts as a good barometer of public interest.50 
If there is no market for a product, the campaign will get a minimal number of backers.51 
Because this measurement of interest typically comes early in the development of a 
project, a campaign that receives little attention or support will “fail quickly,” saving 
the developers time and capital.52 
A crowdfunding campaign can also perform a marketing function by creating interest 
in the project early in its development.53 A campaign that is particularly successful 
or unique may also generate media attention.54 All of these aspects of a successful 
crowdfunding campaign signal to venture capitalists a startup’s market potential.55 
Accordingly, crowdfunding can be a means of obtaining larger amounts of funding later 
on through more traditional avenues.56 According to one report, twenty-eight percent of 
successful crowdfunders received investments from traditional venture capitalist or angel 
investors within three months of completing their campaign.57 GoldieBlox, a toy that 
promotes an interest in engineering in girls age four to nine, is a prime example.58 The 
makers of GoldieBlox signed an agreement with Toys “R” Us after it raised $280,000 
and pre-sold 20,000 toys via its successful Kickstarter campaign.59 Similarly, just a few 
45 C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 Colum. bus. l. rev. 
1, 27 (2012); Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 586 (“Many entrepreneurial ventures remain unfunded, 
partly because of a lack of sufficient value that can be pledged to financial investors and partly because of 
unsuccessful attempts to convince investors.” (citations omitted)).
46 Hemer, supra note 12, at 2 (“CF is on the verge of also becoming a substitute seed financing source 
for entrepreneurial ventures that have difficulties raising capital from traditional sources like bank loans, angel 
capital, VC, state promotion and others because they appear too exotic, too innovative to be understood, too 
complex, too crazy, too risky or which are, simply, poorly presented.”).
47 See id. at 10.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Joel A.C. Baum & Brian S. Silverman, Picking Winners or Building Them? Alliance, Intellectual, 
and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance of Biotechnology Startups, 
19 J. bus. venturing 411, 415 (2004). 
56 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
57 Cheryl Conner, New Report: The ROI of Crowdfunding, forbes (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/01/21/new-report-the-roi-of-crowdfunding/.
58 Alexandros Stefanakis, From Crowd to Retail, launCHt (July 17, 2013), http://www.launcht.com/
blog/2013/07/17/from-crowd-to-retail/.
59 Id.
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months after its wildly successful crowdfunding campaign, Scanadu accrued $10.5 
million in Series A60 financing.61
Contributors to crowdfunding campaigns do not just contribute capital to companies; 
they can also reduce the cost of product development by giving feedback on design 
improvements and consumer preferences.62 In this way, the crowd creates value for the 
crowdfunder by providing free labor.63 Crowds are also an efficient way to problem-
solve; the “collective intelligence” of crowds creates better solutions to problems than 
individuals on their own.64
Finally, crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to obtain financing while allowing 
them to retain ownership of their entire company.65 By retaining complete ownership, 
entrepreneurs have control over the entire product development process and can 
see their vision come to fruition.66 They can accept and incorporate feedback from 
contributors, but they are not required to compromise on anything.67 Crowdfunding is 
also advantageous because it allows entrepreneurs to choose the crowdfunding model 
that suits their product best.
B. Four Models of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding can take one of four forms: the donation model, the lending model, 
the equity model, or the reward/pre-purchase model.68 Different crowdfunding platforms 
allow different models, each with its own benefits and disadvantages. 
The first model, the donation model, is based on the concept of philanthropy.69 
Someone who contributes to a campaign based on the donation model expects nothing 
in return.70 
An entrepreneur using the second model, the lending model, to raise capital asks 
contributors to give the campaign a temporary loan.71 At the very least, contributors 
expect the entrepreneur to return the money that was loaned.72 Some CF platforms 
using the lending model also give contributors a rate of return on their investment.73 
Campaigns based on the third model, the equity model, treat contributors like investors 
and give “equity stakes or similar consideration” in exchange for a contribution.74 This 
model was not permitted in the United States until the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
60 “Series A Financing” is “[t]he first round of financing undergone for a new business venture after 
seed capital. Generally, this is the first time that company ownership is offered to external investors.” Series 
A Financing, investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seriesa.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
61 Eliza Brooke, Scanadu Closes $10.5M Series A Round, Gearing Up to Send Its Medical Tricorder 
Through Clinical Testing, teCHCrunCH (Nov. 12, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/12/scanadu-closes-
10-5m-series-a-round-gearing-up-to-send-its-medical-tricorder-through-clinical-testing/.
62 Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, in 
tHe oxford Handbook of entrepreneurial finanCe 372–74, 379 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012).
63 See Hemer, supra note 12, at 5.
64 Id. at 5–6.
65 tHomas elliot young, tHe everytHing guide to Crowdfunding: learn How to use soCial media 
for small-business funding 17 (2013).
66 See id. 
67 See id.
68 Bradford, supra note 45, at 14–15; Mollick, supra note 11, at 3. 
69 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Bradford, supra note 45, at 20–23.
73 Id. 
74 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3. 
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Act, passed in April of 2012.75 The equity model is heavily regulated by the SEC and 
is rarely used, both inside and outside of the United States.76
Entrepreneurs, who have based their campaign on the forth model, the reward or 
pre-purchase model, give contributors a reward for supporting their projects.77 The 
reward can take many forms including “naming a character after a backer” or getting 
to meet the project creators.78 Most often, crowdfunders give contributors the actual 
product that the campaign is funding.79 Crowdfunders regard these individuals as “early 
customers” and often give them “access to the products . . . at an earlier date, [a] better 
price, or . . . some other special benefit.”80 In essence, this model creates a means of 
pre-selling a product81 and, as of 2013, was the most prevalent model.82 
C. Restrictions on the Pre-Purchase Crowdfunding Model
Most crowdfunding websites have restrictions on what crowdfunders are allowed 
to “pre-sell” in their crowdfunding campaigns.83 Many of these restrictions prevent 
campaigns from selling illegal or dangerous items. For example, Indiegogo, the site that 
Scanadu used to fund the development of the Scout, states in its terms of service that 
crowdfunders cannot offer, among other things, “[f]irearms or weapons”; “[p]rescription 
or illegal drugs”; and “[p]ornography or sexually explicit materials.” 84  
Some crowdfunding platforms have additional restrictions based not on illegality, 
but on consumer protection or the individual preferences and goals of the particular 
site. For example, Kickstarter, a crowdfunding website that funds only “projects,”85 
lists a host of items that cannot be funded using its site, including drug paraphernalia, 
“genetically modified organisms,” and “[a]ny item claiming to cure, treat, or prevent 
an illness or condition (whether via a device, app, book, nutritional supplement, or 
other means).”86 Because of Kickstarter’s restrictions, Scanadu could not have used 
Kickstarter for its crowdfunding campaign. 
75 Id. For more information about the equity model and its interaction with the JOBS Act see sources 
cited supra note 27.
76 massolution, supra note 22 (explaining $116 million was raised in 2012 using equity-based 
crowdfunding, this is just 0.4% of all crowdfunded money raised worldwide).
77 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3. 
78 Bradford, supra note 45, at 16–17.
79 Id. 
80 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3. 
81 See id.; see also Hemer, supra note 12, at 14 (“[C]rowdfunding is basically an advance order of a 
product and represents a purchasing act.”).
82 Mollick, supra note 11, at 3; see also Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 8 n.4 (finding, in a sample 
of crowdfunding campaigns, that “43% are based on either profit sharing or pre-ordering, 15% are equity 
based, 14% are lending based, and the remainder are donation based”).
83 These crowdfunding sites were used, in part, because they were included on Forbes’s top six 
crowdfunding websites. See Kate Taylor, 6 Top Crowdfunding Websites: Which One Is Right for Your Project?, 
forbes (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katetaylor/2013/08/06/6-top-crowdfunding-websites-
which-one-is-right-for-your-project/ (listing Kickstarter, Indiegogo, RocketHub, FundRazr, GoGetFunding, 
and StartSomeGood as the top six crowdfunding websites).
84 Prohibited Perks, indiegogo, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204255166 (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015).
85 Our Rules, kiCkstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
86 Prohibited Items, kiCkstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules/prohibited (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015). When Kickstarter’s “Prohibited Items” list was first surveyed during the course of writing this paper, 
back in February of 2014, this list included “medical, health, safety, and personal care products.” See Leo Sun, 
3 Amazing Medical Technologies Developed on Kickstarter and Indiegogo, motley fool (Feb. 14, 2014), 
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Kickstarter co-founder Yancey Strickler explained that the company utilizes such 
stringent limitations on what projects can be funded through its site because of the 
corrupting power of advertising.87 Products typically are not fully developed at the 
crowdfunding stage, and Kickstarter wants to discourage crowdfunders from overselling, 
or undertaking too much, and trying to figure out how to fulfill the promises later.88 
Kickstarter, like most crowdfunding sites, has an “all-or-nothing” policy.89 Kickstarter 
has sound reasons for this policy: it motivates people to spread the word about a project 
they are excited about, and it creates less risk for everyone because a crowdfunder will 
not be expected to complete an expensive project if they only raise a fraction of the 
needed funds.90 However, this policy also creates perverse incentives: crowdfunders 
may exaggerate the quality or capabilities of their project knowing they will not receive 
any money if they do not meet their goal.91 
Strickler explained that the consequences of over-advertising are amplified when 
it comes to medical devices and products.92 When Kickstarter was created in 2009, it 
allowed medical products to be funded through its site.93 Kickstarter only banned medical 
devices and products after continually receiving project applications making deceitful 
or hyperbolic medical claims.94 Knowing FDA regulates medical products, Kickstarter 
now refuses to host crowdfunding campaigns selling them.95 Not all crowdfunding sites 
share Strickler’s sentiments. In response to Kickerstarter’s rebuff of medical products, 
several healthcare-focused crowdfunding sites launched, including Medstartr, Health 
Tech Hatch, and WeFundr.96 These healthcare-specific sites could be advantageous to 
the medical device industry, which has recently experienced a downturn in investment. 
D. Alternative Sources of Funding for Medical Device 
Companies Are Needed
Experts estimate that investment in the medical device industry is down significantly: 
2012 saw a thirteen percent decrease in the amount of money spent in the industry from 
2011 and a fifteen percent decrease in the number of deals made.97 Even more staggering, 
in 2012 the number of “first-time financings” in the medical device industry dropped to 
1995 levels.98 Part of what is causing this drop in investment is that it is taking longer 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/14/3-amazing-medical-technologies-developed-on-kickst.
aspx#lastVisibleParagraph.
87 Olivia Solon, Kickstarter’s Yancey Strickler: The Culture of Advertising Has Been a Corrupting 
One, wired (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-10/18/yancey-strickler-kickstarter.
88 Id. 
89 See Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, supra note 41. 
90 Id. (“If you need $5,000, it’s tough having $1,000 and a bunch of people expecting you to complete 
a $5,000 project.”).
91 See id.; see also Solon, supra note 87.
92 Solon, supra note 87.
93 Brian Dolan, Medstartr to Launch After Kickstarter Rejects (Some) Health Projects, mobiHealtHnews 
(July 10, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/17841/medstartr-to-launch-after-kickstarter-rejects-some-health-
projects/. 
94 Solon, supra note 87.
95 Id.
96 See Dolan, supra note 93; see also Sophie Park, LUMOback: A Crowdfunding Success, HealtH 2.0 
(July 6, 2012), http://www.health2con.com/news/2012/07/06/13885/.
97 Press Release: Annual Venture Investment Dollars Declined for First Time in Three Years, According 
to the MoneyTree Report, priCewaterHouseCoopers llp (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-
releases/2013/annual-venture-investment-dollars.jhtml.
98 Id.
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than ever to guide a medical device through the applicable regulations and bring it to 
market.99 Michael Carusi, a venture capitalist specializing in biopharmaceuticals and 
medical devices, says this is having a detrimental effect on the U.S. medical device 
market. “[T]he sad reality,” Carusi said, “is that medical device innovation is being 
driven out of the U.S. because of too much regulation.” 100 Investment in medical device 
development is also being discouraged in other ways. For example, the Affordable Care 
Act contains a provision that imposes a 2.3% excise tax on the revenues made from 
medical device sales starting on December 31, 2012.101 
Part of FDA’s mission is promoting innovation in the medical device industry. 
However, a more fundamental goal of FDA’s is protecting consumer safety. This Note 
will now discuss the regulations that advance this objective. 
iii. meDiCAL DeViCes AnD fDA
To fully understand the regulation of medical devices in the United States, it is helpful 
to have some background on the roots of FDA and the historical context that gave 
rise to the modern system of medical device regulation. This Part explains the current 
regulatory scheme and the different paths companies can take to gain FDA approval 
of their medical devices. 
A.  The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
The modern system of medical device regulation is largely a result of the Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDAs) to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1938 (FFDCA).102 Before the MDAs, pharmaceutical companies only had to submit 
drugs, but not medical devices, for FDA approval prior to putting them on the market.103 
The MDAs extended this pre-market approval requirement to medical devices.104 
The MDAs were a reaction to the Dalkon Shield disaster.105 The Dalkon Shield was 
an intrauterine birth control device marketed in the early 1970s.106 Because FDA did 
not have the authority to regulate the Dalkon Shield—as it was a medical device—its 
producer never had to demonstrate that it was safe and effective.107 Women who used the 
Dalkon Shield suffered from “miscarriages, pelvic inflammatory disease, and unplanned 
pregnancies.”108 FDA estimates that the Dalkon Shield affected 200,000 women and 
killed at least seventeen.109 The public outcry after this tragedy provoked Congress to 
strengthen the regulation of medical devices and ultimately pass the MDAs.110 
99 Farr, supra note 25.
100 Id.
101 I.R.C. § 4191 (2012); Medical Device Excise Tax: Frequently Asked Questions, internal revenue 
serviCe (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Medical-Device-Excise-Tax:-Frequently-Asked-Questions.
102 JuditH a. JoHnson, Cong. researCH serv., r42130, fda regulation of mediCal deviCes 22–23 
(2012).
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 23.
105 pHilip J. Hilts, proteCting ameriCa’s HealtH: tHe fda, business, and one Hundred years of 
regulation 329–30 (2003).
106 fran HawtHorne, inside tHe fda: tHe business and politiCs beHind tHe drugs we take and tHe 
food we eat 46–47 (2005).
107 Id.
108 Id. 
109 Id.
110 Id.
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The MDAs took several steps to clarify FDA’s power and procedures when dealing 
with medical devices. First, the MDAs set a definition for “device” that would distinguish 
a medical device from both a drug111 and an unregulated product.112 In basic terms, 
the MDAs clarified that the distinguishing factor between a medical device and an 
unregulated product was whether the manufacturer of the product made any medical 
claims.113 As this Note will later discuss, Scanadu tried to evade this definition of 
medical device by explicitly saying the Scout made no medical claims. As the case law 
has clarified, however, regardless of this statement, the Scout is a medical device.114
Second, the MDAs codified general controls regulating all medical devices.115 
Included in these general controls are the requirements that a medical device cannot 
be adulterated or misbranded and must meet registering, listing, recordkeeping, import, 
and export requirements.116 This Article will later explain how Scanadu failed to follow 
these general controls when shipping the Scout because, at the time, the Scout was an 
adulterated or misbranded medical device.117 
Third, the MDAs defined three classes of medical devices.118 FDA categorizes all 
devices into one of these three classes based on the risk that they pose to the public.119 
A device’s classification affects what the manufacturer is required to submit to FDA 
before the device can be sold to consumers and what regulations the product is subject 
to after the product has been put on the market.120 
Class I encompasses the lowest risk devices, such as elastic bandages and examination 
gloves.121 In most cases, FDA only requires the manufacturer of a Class I medical device 
to register it before selling it.122 However, in rare instances, FDA specifically requires 
the manufacturer to submit a 510(k), an application for approval,123 before marketing 
the Class I device.124 It is also rare for FDA to impose regulations on Class I devices 
beyond the general controls: ninety-five percent of Class I devices are exempt from 
special regulatory requirements.125 
111 The MDAs separated a medical device from a drug by declaring that a medical device “does not 
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(h) 
(West 2014).
112 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 23.
113 Bruce D. Armon, FDA Regulatory Scheme, in bringing your mediCal deviCe to market 137, 
139–40 (John B. Reiss & Bruce D. Armon, eds., 2006); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(h) (“The term ‘device’. 
. . means an instrument . . . which is--(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States 
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, 
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or (3) intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes 
through chemical action within or on the body.”).
114 See infra Part IV.A.1.
115 21 U.S.C.A. § 331; Armon, supra note 113.
116 Armon, supra note 113.
117 See infra Part IV.A.2
118 United States v. Endotec, Inc., 563 F.3d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009).
119 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996)).
120 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 4–7.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 For an explanation of 510(k) see infra Part III.B.1.
124 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 4–7.
125 Armon, supra note 113, at 140.
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Class II devices pose a moderate risk, and, accordingly, FDA may subject these 
devices to special controls.126 Power wheelchairs and infusion pumps are examples 
of Class II devices.127 Most companies seeking to sell a Class II device must submit 
a 510(k) to FDA before marketing the device, although FDA has the discretion to 
exempt some Class II devices from this requirement.128 FDA has the authority to levy 
“device-specific” regulations,129 but generally these special controls include “postmarket 
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines.”130 FDA 
currently imposes special controls on fifteen percent of all Class II medical devices.131
A Class III medical device is a device that is “purported or represented to be for a use 
in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance 
in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury.”132 This class includes heart valves and metal-on-metal hip joints.133 FDA 
requires most Class III device manufacturers to obtain Premarket Approval (PMA)134 
before the device can be made available to consumers.135 
More specifically, FDA requires an approved PMA for three types of Class III devices: 
1) devices that are not substantially equivalent to devices that were already on the market 
prior to the enactment of the 1976 amendments; 2) devices that are required by federal 
regulation (listed in 21 C.F.R.) to provide a PMA; and 3) all “new” devices that are 
not substantially equivalent to any device currently on the market.136 All other Class 
III devices may be approved using a 510(k).137 When a new device enters the market, 
FDA automatically categorizes it as a Class III device.138 In order to avoid having to 
obtain a PMA, a manufacturer of a new device may petition FDA to have the device 
reclassified as a Class I or Class II device.139 
The Scout is a brand new device. Nothing like it has ever been made before. In fact, 
Scanadu is in the running for the Qualcomm X-Prize,140 a competition to build the 
126 Id. at 140–41.
127 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 4–7.
128 Id.
129 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319 (2008) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 360j(e)(1) (2007)).
130 Armon, supra note 113.
131 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 5–6.
132 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 513(a)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (West 
2014).
133 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 5.
134 For an explanation of PMA see supra Part III.B.2.
135 Armon, supra note 113, at 141. 
136 Id.; see also PMA Approvals, food & drug admin., http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/
productsandmedicalprocedures/deviceapprovalsandclearances/pmaapprovals/default.htm (last updated Jan. 
13, 2015).
137 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 6–7.
138 Armon, supra note 113. This policy applies unless the device is quite obviously a Class I device.
139 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 6 (citing FFDCA § 513(f)(2)).
140 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
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first “Medical Tricorder,”141 the winner of which will receive a $10 million prize.142 
Given this novelty, the Scout was a Class III device when it held its crowdfunding 
campaign. As a Class III device, Scanadu was required to submit the Scout for PMA 
or for reclassification before introducing the Scout into interstate commerce. Scanadu 
did neither. FDA also did nothing to stop Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign or the 
initial shipment to contributors.
B.  Different Paths to the Market
As mentioned above, FDA requires a company seeking to bring a medical device 
to market to go through different processes depending on the risk the device poses. 
Generally, the more risk the device poses, the more rigorous the approval process. 
This Part will provide a brief explanation of the different paths to market, which will 
provide some background on the options and responsibilities Scanadu had when first 
contemplating bringing the Scout to market. 
1. The 510(k)
A 510(k), named after the applicable section of the FFDCA, is the conduit that 
most manufacturers of Class II devices use to get their product to market.143 Through 
a 510(k), the manufacturer must show that its product is substantially equivalent to a 
device already on the market that statutorily does not require a PMA.144 A device meets 
the requirements of substantial equivalence if it is shown to be “as safe and effective as 
the predicate device(s).”145 The goal of a 510(k) is to show that “the device performs in a 
similar fashion to the predicate [device] under a similar set of circumstances.”146 Clinical 
studies are not usually required to establish this.147 Besides providing information 
about the device’s performance under specific conditions, a standard 510(k) includes 
information about the device’s design, components, packaging, and labeling.148 
Though far less rigorous than a PMA, the development of a 510(k) can still be quite 
expensive. A Stanford study found that the average cost of bringing a “low-to-moderate-
risk 510(k) product from concept to clearance was approximately $31 million, with $24 
million spent on FDA dependent and/or related activities.”149 In addition, FDA requires 
a $5,018 fee for the review of a 510(k).150  
141 A medical tricorder is “a hand-held medical scanner that can take readings from a patient and then 
diagnose various conditions.” The Dream of the Medical Tricorder, eConomist (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.
economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21567208-medical-technology-hand-held-diagnostic-devices-
seen-star-trek-are-inspiring. The medical tricorder made its debut in 1966 on the science fiction television 
series Star Trek. Id. On the show, Dr. McCoy used a fictional version of the medical tricorder to diagnose 
patients. Id.
142 Overview, QualComm triCorder xprize, http://tricorder.xprize.org/about/overview (last visited Feb. 
19, 2015).
143 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 9.
144 Id. 
145 Id.
146 Id. 
147 Id.
148 Id. 
149 makower et al., supra note 24, at 7.
150 MDUFA III  Fees ,  Food & Drug Admin. ,  ht tp: / /www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/MDUFAIII/ucm313673.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2014).
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2. Premarket Approval
FDA requires all companies seeking to sell a new or exceptionally risky device to 
first obtain PMA,151 an arduous task.152 “The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours 
reviewing each application,” which usually consists of multiple volumes of reports, 
descriptions of methods used, lists of component parts, manufacturing processes, and 
label specimens.153 The standard PMA fee for fiscal year 2014 is $258,502.154 But this 
fee is miniscule compared to the overall costs of developing a product and meeting all 
of the testing specifications. A Stanford study estimates that it costs on average $94 
million to bring a Class III device requiring PMA to market, with $75 million of that 
going towards meeting FDA requirements.155 Companies spend a large portion of this 
money on clinical trials, which present an additional set of regulations; most notably, 
companies must obtain preliminary approval, also known as an Investigational Device 
Exemption (IDE).
3. Investigational Device Exemption
A medical device manufacturer must obtain an IDE before shipping the device 
to clinical study participants.156 The IDE fixes the PMA’s “catch-22”; without this 
exception, companies could not ship the device across state lines for use in the clinical 
trials, which are required in order to obtain final approval.157 
There are different requirements a company must meet when applying for an IDE, 
depending on the level of risk posed by the medical device being tested.158 After obtaining 
an IDE, a manufacturer can lawfully ship a device for use in its clinical studies without 
complying “with other requirements of the FFDCA, such as registration and listing.”159 
As this Note will discuss later, Scanadu did not obtain an IDE before launching its 
crowdfunding campaign and promising contributors the opportunity to participate in its 
clinical trials. Even if it had, however, Scanadu’s strategy of obtaining its test subjects 
through its crowdfunding campaign poses a moral hazard that FDA should address. 
iV. sCAnADU ContRAVeneD fDA ReGULAtions 
In selling the Scout through its crowdfunding campaign, Scanadu evaded all of the 
detailed regulations explained above that were designed specifically to protect the health 
and safety of consumers. This Part will explain which specific regulations Scanadu 
contravened and how Scanadu’s actions are directly in conflict with the overall purpose 
and mission of FDA.  
Scanadu planned to ship its prototype of the Scout to thousands of its crowdfunding 
campaign donors in March of 2014.160 At that time, Scanadu had not yet received—or 
151 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 11.
152 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008).
153 Id. at 318.
154 MDUFA III Fees, supra note 150.
155 makower et al., supra note 24, at 7.
156 Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), food & drug admin., http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/
InvestigationalDeviceExemptionIDE/ (last updated June 19, 2014) (“All clinical evaluations of investigational 
devices, unless exempt, must have an approved IDE before the study is initiated.”).
157 Id. 
158 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
159 JoHnson, supra note 102, at 12.
160 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
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even applied for—FDA approval.161 Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign created two 
groups of contributors: those who opted to participate in the Scout’s clinical trials 
(participants) and those who did not (non-participants).162 Each group poses separate 
and unique legal issues that will be addressed in turn. 
A.  The Non-Participants
Scanadu’s actions in regards to the non-participants poses a legal issue because, 
in shipping the Scout to this group, Scanadu moved an “adulterated or misbranded” 
medical device in interstate commerce as prohibited by the FFDCA.163 To establish 
a violation of this statute, which is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), the Government 
must show three things: (1) the product is a “device” as defined in the FFDCA; (2) the 
product is an “adulterated or misbranded” device; and (3) the product moved in interstate 
commerce.164 Under the FFDCA, a medical device is adulterated if “it is required to 
receive premarket approval from the FDA but moves in commerce even though it did 
not receive premarket approval.”165 
In plain language, it is a violation of the FFDCA to sell an unapproved Class III 
medical device to someone in another state.166 That is exactly what Scanadu did when 
it held its crowdfunding campaign and sold the Scout to consumers who would not opt 
to participate in the clinical trials. The following three subsections elaborate on how 
Scanadu’s actions meet the elements for a violation of this statute. 
1.  The Scout Is a Medical Device
The Scout is unquestionably a medical device as defined by the FFDCA. Scanadu tried 
to sidestep FDA regulation by calling the Scout a “research tool” instead of a medical 
device.167 The Scout’s crowdfunding campaign rhetoric laid the foundation for avoiding 
the regulation: “We are creating a medical-grade device, which is not yet fully accurate 
and not FDA-approved. Hence this is not a medical device . . . and makes no medical 
claims.”168 Scanadu further asserted that “[a]s a research tool, the product will not pose 
any risk to users and can be used to collect, store and display all your information, but 
without making specific disease diagnosis.”169 
This linguistic manipulation should not automatically free Scanadu from the purview 
of FDA regulatory scheme. The plain language of the regulation, the case law interpreting 
the statute, and the purpose and goals of FDA’s regulations demonstrate why the Scout 
is a medical device and why Scanadu should not be able to evade FDA by calling the 
Scout a “research tool.”
While saying that the Scout makes no “medical claims,” Scanadu also maintains that 
it measures body temperature, blood pressure, heart rate, and more. All of the traditional 
devices that measure these same vital signs—a thermometer,170 a sphygmomanometer,171 
161 Id. 
162 Id.
163 United States v. Endotec, Inc., 563 F.3d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 2009).
164 United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1999).
165 563 F.3d at 1190.
166 Id.
167 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
168 Id.
169 Id. 
170 21 C.F.R. § 880.2920 (2014).
171 Id. § 870.1120.
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even a stethoscope172—are all considered medical devices. The FFDCA defines “device” 
as an instrument “intended for use in the diagnosis . . . cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease.”173 The factor courts consider most determinative of whether a 
product is a device is the “objective intent” of the product manufacturer: 
[T]he intent is determined by such persons’ expressions or may be shown by the 
circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for 
example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements 
by such persons or their representatives. It may be shown by the circumstances that the 
article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used 
for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.174
Because intent is the dispositive factor, whether the product actually diagnoses or 
treats a disease or condition has no affect on whether the product is subject to medical 
device regulations.175 
In determining a manufacturer’s intent, FDA is not constrained by the manufacturer’s 
claim that its product is not a medical device.176 The District of Minnesota spoke directly 
to this principle in United States v. Sybaritic, Inc.177 In Sybaritic, FDA had issued a 
cessation order, demanding that the defendant, Sybaritic, Inc., stop selling its products 
because they were medical devices under the FFDCA and had not been approved for 
sale under the applicable FDA regulations.178 Sybaritic argued that their products were 
not medical devices and thus did not have to comply with the regulations.179 
In analyzing whether the products were medical devices, the Sybaritic court 
considered the “intended use of the product as determined from its label, accompanying 
labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and any other relevant source, including 
consumer intent.”180 The advertising promoting the defendants’ products clearly stated 
that the products helped with weight loss, scar reductions, and wrinkle reduction.181 
The court found these health-related claims put the products squarely within the federal 
definition of medical device.182 The defendant’s bald contention that it was not selling 
medical devices nor making medical claims had no effect on the court’s decision.183
FDA and federal courts have consistently held that the intent of the manufacturer 
and the consumer in purchasing and using the product is the critical factor in whether 
a product is considered a medical device.184 Even when the product is unconventional, 
when the medical claims are not based off of modern science, or when the medical 
172 Id. § 870.1875.
173 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(h) (West 2014).
174 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2014).
175 See id. 
176 United States v. Sybaritic, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (D. Minn. 2011).
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1163–64.
179 Id. at 1165.
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1165–66.
183 Id. at 1165 (“Defendants argue that the Slimline POD, Slimline OXYPOD Deluxe, and the Alpha 
LED Oxy Lite–Spa are not ‘devices’ since the expert it retained pursuant to the consent decree declared they 
were not devices . . . . However, the Court notes that the consent decree contemplated that any decision of the 
expert would be subject to an audit, indicating that his determination was not final or binding on the FDA. 
Therefore, this reasoning is not persuasive.”).
184 See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 216 (D.D.C. 2002).
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claims seem implausible, courts look at what manufacturers intend consumers to use 
the product for.185 
The plaintiffs in Holistic Candlers and Consumer Association v. U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration disputed FDA’s determination that the plaintiffs’ ear candles were 
medical devices.186 Ear candles are fabric cones dipped in wax that are “intended to 
remove excess ear wax.”187 Consumers are instructed to place one end of the candle 
in their ear and light the other end on fire; as it burns, the candle creates a vacuum to 
draw wax and other impurities from the ear.188 
The ear candle manufacturers claimed the ear candles were not medical devices 
but rather a “natural holistic modality . . . intended to be used for relaxation, comfort, 
reduction of stress and for the natural furtherance of the well-being of the user.”189 
Defendants provided affidavits from consumers testifying that they use ear candles 
only for relaxation and not for medical purposes.190 The ear candle manufacturers, 
however, had advertised the products as improving “sinus congestion, colds, the flu, sore 
throats, earaches, ear infections, sinus infections, lymphatic congestion, [and] swollen 
glands.”191 FDA had determined these were medical claims and advised the ear candle 
manufacturer that they must cease selling the devices or remove the medical claims 
from all advertisements and labels.192 
Federal courts have also held that “labels of disclaimer are not controlling, but are 
to be considered together with any extrinsic evidence of the device’s intended use.”193 
The Ninth Circuit, in Church of Scientology of California v. Richardson, affirmed a 
district court determination that the “Hubbard E-meter” was a medical device subject 
to FDA regulations.194 The Hubbard E-meter is a “simple skin galvanometer that 
crudely measures changes in electrical resistance in the human body.”195 The Church 
of Scientology argued that the Hubbard E-meters were “not misbranded because they 
bear declamatory labels”; the E-meters were marked with the warning: “Not intended 
or effective for the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of any disease.”196 The court 
concluded that these disclaimers held no weight in determining whether the products 
185 See, e.g., FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2006) amended for reconsideration 
in part, 472 F. Supp. 2d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2007) aff’d, 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008) and aff’d, 512 F.3d 858 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (determining that the Q-Ray bracelet was a medical device, based primarily on its advertisements 
which claimed that the metal bracelet “provides immediate significant or complete relief from various types 
of pain”); United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 755 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that 
the defendant’s product, an electric gas grill igniter outfitted with a finger grip, was a medical device because 
the defendant marketed them as pain-relieving devices); United States v. One Unlabeled Unit, More or Less, 
of an Article of Device & Promotional Brochures, 885 F. Supp. 1025, 1027–28 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that 
a vinyl-covered bed with audio speakers mounted on its side was a device because the defendants claimed 
the bed improved circulation and balance and “reduce[d] the need for insulin, reduced cholesterol, reduced 
arthritis pain”).
186 Holistic Candlers & Consumer Ass’n v. FDA, 770 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D.D.C. 2011).
187 FDA Important Alert: Detention Without Physical Examination of Ear Candles, food & drug admin. 
(June 20, 2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_225.html
188 Id. 
189 Brief of Appellant, 770 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-5118), 2011 WL 3947231, at *36.
190 Id. 
191 770 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
192 Id. at 157.
193 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Alberty Food 
Prods. v. United States 194 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1952)).
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 216.
196 Id. at 218.
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were adulterated medical devices because there was clear evidence that the E-meters 
were intended for medical use.197 The skin galvanometers measured “skin voltage 
by means of surface skin electrodes”198 and were “used as tools in psychoanalysis, 
hypnotherapy, biofeedback, and behavior therapy.”199 
Although the Scout is far more technologically sophisticated that the Hubbard 
E-meter, the two products are the same in several respects. Like the Scout, the E-meters 
did not directly treat a condition, but rather measured some physical phenomenon 
occurring in the human body. The only possible purpose of the E-meter’s measurements 
was medical in nature; no disclaimer could nullify this fact. The Scout similarly takes 
measurements that are undoubtedly for medical use. Therefore, Scanadu’s assertion 
that the Scout makes no medical claims should be rejected. 
In Church of Scientology, the Ninth Circuit made several other important points. First, 
the court disregarded the defendant’s admission that the E-meters were “ineffective for 
any medical therapeutic purpose.”200 A product does not escape the definition of medical 
device simply because it is ineffective.201 Second, the court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the E-meters could not cause harm to any user.202 The court analogized the 
E-meter to the product at issue in Drown v. United States, the “Drown Radio Therapeutic 
Instrument.”203 The maker of the Drown Radio Therapeutic Instrument made many 
fantastical claims including that the device could cure breast cancer, treat “cirrhosis 
and carcinoma of the right kidney,” and “prevent loss of speech and memory.”204 In 
Drown, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]hile the instruments may be harmless in 
themselves, their danger lies in the possibility that ‘ignorant and gullible persons are 
likely to rely upon them instead of seeking professional advice for conditions they are 
represented to relieve or prevent.’”205 This point made by the Drown court summarizes 
why even a relatively benign device still needs to conform to FDA regulations. 
Scanadu’s non-participating contributors are the exact “ignorant and gullible” people 
the Drown court was speaking about. The Scout purports to measure vital signs and it 
is likely that consumers intend to use the Scout to do just that. In fact, that is the only 
thing the Scout could be used for. If the Scout is not accurate or malfunctions, these 
consumers will be put at risk. 
Scanadu might have wanted to tap into one of crowdfunding’s most valuable 
resources—consumer feedback on a large-scale—before having to comply with FDA 
regulations. However, altering a medical device requires a second round of tests and 
197 Id. Because of the obvious medical use, the skin galvanometer was later codified as a Class II medical 
device in the Code of Federal Regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 882.1560 (2014).
198 21 C.F.R. § 882.1560.
199 Gretchen Reevy, enCyClopedia of emotion 281 (2010).
200 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1971).
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. (citing Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1952)).
204 Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1952) (“The Drown Radio Therapeutic 
Instrument, the device whose sale resulted in her arrest, is represented as capable of eliminating a lump in 
the breast and preventing cancer therefrom; as efficacious in treating kidney and bladder complications, 
tipped uterus, extra kidney, painful urination, streptococcus in the urethra and the pyloric end of the stomach 
and bladder, cirrhosis and carcinoma of the right kidney, low function of the left suprarenal gland, pancreas, 
fibrous adhesions in the brain and meningeal tissue, brain sinus, cystic fluid in the brain and medulla, heart 
trouble, head pains and noises, explosions in right ear while falling asleep, constipation, pains in the lower 
back, abcesses, loss of speech and memory, worry, fear and nervousness, conditions of the colon and liver.”).
205 Id. at 1006 (citations omitted).
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applications for approval,206 and Scanadu likely sought to avoid the costs of having to 
go through the approval process multiple times. FDA does not allow purely consumer 
focused feedback on medical devices prior to approval because of the risks those devices 
pose.207 Calling a product a “research tool” instead of a medical device does not negate 
the potential risk. Consumers who receive the Scout will undoubtedly use the device 
and use it for its clearly intended medical purpose. The Scout, therefore, falls squarely 
within the definition of medical device.
It is critical to acknowledge that the Scout is not simply a “research device” because 
medical devices—but not research devices—are required to undergo testing during which 
potential harmful side effects or defects can be spotted and prevented. The Thalidomide 
crisis can lend some insight into the possible consequences of skipping over this critical 
step when developing an experimental product like the Scout. 
Chemie Grünenthal, a German company, invented Thalidomide and began selling it 
on the German market in 1957.208 Chemie Grünenthal sold Thalidomide to Richardson-
Merrell, through its principal, Vicks Chemical Company, in 1958.209 Richardson-Merrell 
planned to sell the drug on the U.S. market as a sedative and as an anti-nausea medication 
to be taken during pregnancy.210 The FFDCA at the time allowed pharmaceutical 
companies to distribute unapproved drugs to a limited number of “qualified experts” 
on the condition “that the drug was labeled as being under investigation.”211 Merrel 
shipped Thalidomide samples to 1,267 doctors for experimental use in early 1960, seven 
months before it sent its application to FDA seeking to officially market the drug.212 
FDA denied the application and made specific demands on the company to provide 
more data showing the drug was safe and effective, specifically in pregnant women.213
In November 1961, news broke in Europe of the severe birth defects that Thalidomide 
caused in babies whose mothers took the drug while pregnant.214 Chemie Grünenthal 
quickly took the drug off the market, but the drug had already been on the market for 
four years with devastating results: an estimated 8,000 babies were born in European 
countries with severe deformities because of the drug, while several thousand more 
died in the womb.215 FDA estimates there were about forty cases in the United States, 
all from Merrell’s experimental release of the drug.216
The Thalidomide crisis is just one example of what can happen when a medical 
product is released for a limited use prior to regulatory approval. The current regulations 
206 Deciding When to Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing Device, food & drug admin. 
(Jan. 10, 1997), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
ucm080235.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2014). 
207 IDE Approval Process, food & drug admin., http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/investigationaldeviceexemptionide/ucm046164.
htm#non_sig_risk (last updated June 26, 2014) (“[C]onsumer preference testing, testing of a modification, 
or testing of a combination of devices if the device(s) are legally marketed device(s) [that is, the devices have 
an approved PMA, cleared Premarket Notification 510(k), or are exempt from 510(k)] AND if the testing 
is not for the purpose of determining safety or effectiveness and does not put subjects at risk.” (alteration in 
original)).
208 Hilts, supra note 105, at 146–48. 
209 Id. at 149.
210 Id. at 150.
211 paul J. feldstein, The Politics of Health Legislation: An Economic Perspective 206 (3d ed. 2006).
212 Hilts, supra note 105, at 151–52.
213 Id. at 152–53.
214 Id. at 155.
215 Id. at 155, 158.
216 Id. at 158.
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were intended to prevent these types of disasters, but the regulations carry no weight 
if they are not followed in all applicable circumstances. The Scout may seem like an 
innocuous device, but that, in itself, is not a good reason to exempt the Scout from 
premarket regulation. By going through the statutorily proscribed vetting process, 
FDA can ensure the Scout is safe, accurate, and does not present other hidden risks 
for consumers.
2. The Scout Is an “Adulterated or Misbranded” Device
When Scanadu held its crowdfunding campaign, and subsequently shipped the device 
to its contributors, the Scout was not only a medical device, but also an “adulterated 
device” moving in interstate commerce, which is a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).217 A 
device is adulterated under the FFDCA if “it is required to receive premarket approval 
. . . from the FDA but moves in commerce even though it did not receive this PMA.”218 
Recall that the Scout is a Class III device requiring PMA because the Scout is a new 
device that has not been reclassified.219 
3. The Crowdfunding Campaign Introduced the Scout  
into Interstate Commerce
By raising money through a reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding campaign model, 
Scanadu put the Scout into interstate commerce for commercial distribution. When the 
Scout was shipped to contributors, there was no doubt that Scanadu had introduced the 
device into interstate commerce. But the Scout was introduced into interstate commerce 
even before that. The crowdfunding campaign in itself introduced the device into 
interstate commerce, and thus was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign advertised the Scout to thousands of consumers 
over the Internet. These consumers were located all across the nation and around the 
world. When a contributor made a contribution to the campaign through Indiegogo, 
the contributors’ credit cards or PayPal accounts were charged immediately after the 
checkout process was completed.220 When the campaign reached its goal, Scanadu was 
“legally bound to perform on any promise and/or commitment to Contributors (including 
delivering any Perks).”221 A crowdfunder which cannot fulfill its promised perks must 
negotiate a “mutually satisfactory resolution” with contributors, “which may include 
refunding their Contributions.”222 
In other words, when a crowdfunder offers a product as a “perk” on a campaign 
page, and the contributor gives the designated amount needed to receive that perk, the 
crowdfunder and the contributor have entered into a contract. During the execution of 
the contract, the contribution is transferred across state lines and thus through interstate 
commerce. 
The reward/pre-purchase model can also be framed as a donation. Indeed, many CF 
platforms describe the interaction between contributor and crowdfunder as a charitable 
donation. Indiegogo calls any product offered in exchange for a contribution a “perk”223; 
217 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a) (West 2014).
218 United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1999).
219 See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
220 Indiegogo Playbook: After Your Campaign, indiegogo, https://go.indiegogo.com/playbook/life-
cycle-phase/finishing-strong (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
221 Terms of Use, indiegogo, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/terms (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
222 Id. 
223 Indiegogo Playbook: After Your Campaign, supra note 43.
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Kickstarter calls them “rewards.”224 But many crowdfunders on both sites, and many 
others, refer to their campaigns as a means to pre-order their product, album, or film.225 
The academic literature also describes this crowdfunding model as a way of “pre-
ordering” or “pre-selling” a product.226
While Scanadu never used the terms “pre-order” or “buy” on its campaign page, 
other language indicates Scanadu intended for the campaign to be a pre-ordering 
mechanism. For example, as the donation increased, the contributor was able to benefit 
from economies of scale: if the contributor gave $756 she would receive four Scouts, 
meaning each would “cost[ ] $189 instead of $199.”227 This explicit language used by 
Scanadu indicates an intention to sell the Scout through its crowdfunding campaign. 
To make a donation, a “donor must transfer an ownership interest to the donee without 
consideration and with donative intent.”228 The Scanadu campaign contributions do not 
meet this definition because they were given in exchange for consideration: the obligation 
to deliver the Scouts or return the money. The contributions to Scanadu’s crowdfunding 
campaign, then, are not donations but rather contracts for sale.229 These contracts were 
executed during the crowdfunding campaign and resulted in transfers of money across 
state lines. Scanadu, therefore, introduced the Scout into interstate commerce.
Scanadu’s actions satisfy all three elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
The Scout is a “device” as defined in the FFDCA, and the Scout required PMA before 
being introduced into interstate commerce, yet Scanadu introduced it into interstate 
commerce without obtaining clearance.230 This decision, to make the Scout available 
to consumers without any level of review by FDA, by definition put consumers at risk. 
Other medical device companies that are planning on using crowdfunding should realize 
and understand this reality.
Scanadu is just one example of a medical device company using crowdfunding. As 
crowdfunding continues to increase in popularity, more companies that are seeking to 
sell medical devices, devices that are potentially far more dangerous than the Scout, 
could use the pre-purchase model to distribute those devices to imprudent consumers. 
If successful, this strategy undermines FDA medical device regulatory scheme and 
causes undue risk.
Scanadu is not the only medical device company that has used crowdfunding to raise 
money pre-FDA approval. Biosense, the maker of the uChek, is following Scanadu’s 
crowdfunding strategy.231 The “uChek Universal” is a “mobile urinalysis system” that 
uses a smartphone camera to analyze urine dipsticks.232 The uChek Universal system 
provides information about ten different analytes present in the tested urine. 233 This 
224 Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, supra note 41.
225 Search “pre-order” on http://www.indiegogo.com/ or http://www.kickstarter.com/.
226 See, e.g., Hemer, supra note 12, at 9.
227 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
228 See restatement (tHird) of property: wills & otHer donative transfers § 6.1(a) (2003).
229 See ContraCt, blaCk’s law diCtionary (10th ed. 2014).
230 See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1999).
231 Brian Dolan, uChek Aims to Follow Scanadu’s Pre-FDA Crowdfunding Strategy, mobiHealtHnews 
(July 23, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/24056/uchek-aims-to-follow-scanadus-pre-fda-crowdfunding-
strategy/.
232 uChek: Technology, biosense, http://www.biosense.in/uchek.html (follow “Technology” menu link 
on left side) (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
233 General FAQs about uChek, biosense, http://www.biosense.in/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
The uChek Universal is designed to measure “analytes like glucose, protein, ketones, urobilinogen, bilirubin, 
specific gravity, blood, pH, leukocytes and nitrites.” Id.
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information, which is presented and analyzed through the uChek smartphone app, can 
be used to diagnose and monitor a variety of conditions including diabetes and “many 
bladder, liver and kidney disorders.”234
Interestingly, Biosense tried to put the uChek Universal on the market in April of 
2013 and was admonished by FDA for doing so prior to obtaining FDA approval.235 
Biosense registered its smartphone application on April 5, 2013, and sold its first device 
in the United States on April 28, 2013.236 FDA sent Biosense a warning letter on May 
21, 2013, informing the company that it would have to obtain FDA clearance for the 
uChek system before making it available to consumers.237 Biosense took the uChek 
off the market and turned to the crowd to gain the necessary funds to apply for FDA 
approval.238 Biosense also negotiated with FDA and the two were able to come up with a 
compromise: FDA agreed to allow Biosense to sell the “uChek Lite,” but not the uChek 
Universal, without first obtaining FDA clearance.239 The difference between the uChek 
Lite and the uChek Universal is the uChek Lite does not measure blood or glucose.240 
Biosense is still working toward obtaining clearance for the uChek Universal and 
has launched an Indiegogo campaign to help it do so.241 The Indiegogo campaign gives 
contributors the option of purchasing the “uChek Original” for $25, the uCheck Universal 
for $84, and many multi-pack options.242 The campaign also informed contributors that 
“[a]ll uChek devices would ship after CE243 and FDA clearances.”244 The vital difference 
between the crowdfunding campaigns associated with the Scout and the uChek is the 
fact that Scanadu shipped the Scout to consumers before receiving FDA approval, while 
Biosense waited to ship the uChek until after FDA approved it. Biosense’s solution, 
however, did not address an additional problem Scanadu’s crowdfunding strategy poses: 
whether campaign contributors should participate in pre-market clinical trials. 
B. The Participants
Scanadu’s interactions with the contributors who opted to participate in the Scout’s 
clinical trials pose another issue in addition to the violation for introducing adulterated 
devices into interstate commerce.245 Allowing backers of a crowdfunded medical device 
234 Id.
235 See Letter to Biosense Technologies Private Limited Concerning the uChek Urine Analyzer, food & 
drug admin., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm353513.htm (last updated 
June 24, 2014). 
236 Shiv Gaglani, uChek Launches Indiegogo Campaign: Interview with CEO Myshkin Ingawale, 
medgadget (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.medgadget.com/2013/08/smartphone-based-urine-analysis-interview-
with-ucheks-myshkin-ingawale.html.
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 See id. 
240 Id. 
241 Ki Mae Heussner, Urine-analysis App Turns to Indiegogo to Help It Win FDA Clearance, gigaom 
(July 30, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/07/30/urine-analysis-app-turns-to-indiegogo-to-help-it-win-fda-
clearance/.
242 uChek Universal: The Medical Lab in Your Phone, indiegogo, http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/
uchek-universal-the-medical-lab-in-your-phone?c=activity (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
243 “The CE marking (an acronym for the French ‘Conformite Europeenne’) certifies that a product 
has met EU health, safety, and environmental requirements, which ensure consumer safety.” CE Marking – 
Program Overview, export.gov, http://export.gov/cemark/eg_main_017268.asp (last updated Mar. 7, 2013).
244 uChek Universal: The Medical Lab in Your Phone, supra note 242.
245 Note that at the time Scanadu held the crowdfunding campaign, it did not know if anyone would opt 
into the clinical studies. No contributor would be given the chance to participate in the clinical trials until 
after they received the Scout in the mail. Technically then, every sale of the device via the crowdfunding 
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to become subjects in the device’s clinical trials creates the type of conflict of interest 
that FDA avidly works to avoid.246 Considering the potential for bias and the many 
alterative methods for obtaining test subjects, FDA should prohibit this practice. 
A device company is usually required to obtain an IDE from FDA before conducting 
its clinical trials.247 Scanadu failed to obtain an IDE before launching its crowdfunding 
campaign and promising contributors the opportunity to participate in the clinical trials. 
Even if Scanadu had obtained regulatory approval, FDA should prohibit these trials 
because of the potential conflict of interest they pose. 
1. Scanadu Should Have Obtained an IDE  
for Its Clinical Trial Participants
As mentioned before, an IDE allows a company to ship a Class III medical device 
in interstate commerce before receiving PMA in order “to obtain the test data needed 
for approval.”248 The IDE provides strict guidelines that must be met during the clinical 
trials to ensure the continued safety of the user.249 The IDE allows the shipment of 
unapproved devices only to “experts qualified by scientific training and experience.”250 
More specifically, under the IDE, the “device has to be shipped . . . to physicians who 
will test the device in patients under controlled circumstances.”251 
Rather than shipping the device to experts or physicians, Scanadu is shipping the 
Scout directly to patients who could use the device for other purposes outside of the 
clinical studies.252 Knowing this information, it is hard to see how the Scout is being 
shipped for purely investigational purposes or meeting the IDE requirements. Scanadu 
also missed one very important procedural requirement: a company wishing to obtain 
an IDE typically must apply for and obtain the IDE before “enrolling patients at the 
study site.”253 
The IDE guidelines require different levels of precautions based on a particular 
device’s level of risk. A company developing a “significant risk device” must obtain 
an IDE from FDA and must have every one of the sites at which it plans to conduct 
campaign, and the subsequent shipment of those devices, was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). See supra 
Part IV.A. When Scandau ran its crowdfunding campaign, its Indiegogo page read, “[w]hen you receive your 
Scanadu Scout™, you will also be receiving the Informed Consent document which will enable you to take 
part in the community, participate in our usability study, and help us define the final properties of the device.” 
Charles Luzar, Indiegogo Campaign Roundup: Home Health Monitoring, Crowdfunding Legal Costs, Help 
Kids With Autism, Crowdfund insider (May 23, 2013), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/05/16032-
indiegogo-campaign-roundup-home-health-monitoring-crowdfunding-legal-costs-help-kids-with-autism/. 
Scanadu has since modified this language to read, “[b]efore you are eligible to receive your Scanadu Scout™, 
you will also be receive [sic] information about the study and the Informed Consent document.” Scanadu 
Scout, supra note 13.
246 See What We Do, food & drug admin., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/ (last updated Aug. 
5, 2014) (“FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security 
of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, 
and products that emit radiation. FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed 
innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.”).
247 See infra Part IV.B.1.
248 See supra Part III.B.3; United States v. Endotec, Inc., 563 F.3d 1187, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009).
249 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360j(g) (West 2014).
250 563 F.3d at 1201.
251 Id.
252 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
253 IDE Approval Process, supra note 207; 21 C.F.R. § 812.2 (2014). 
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clinical studies approved by an institutional review board (IRB).254 “Nonsignificant risk 
devices,” on the other hand, do not require an IDE from FDA, but rather must obtain 
approval only from an IRB.255 Diagnostic devices are exempt from obtaining an IDE 
from FDA altogether, if the testing:
1. is noninvasive;
2. does not require an invasive sampling procedure that presents significant risk;
3. does not by design or intention introduce energy into a subject; and
4. is not used as a diagnostic procedure without confirmation by another medically 
established diagnostic product or procedure.256
Because it is intended to measure vital signs, the Scout would probably be classified 
as a diagnostic device. So long as other medically established devices confirmed the 
Scout’s readings during the clinical trials, Scanadu might not have needed an IDE before 
conducting its clinical trials. 
2. Crowdfunding Campaign Contributors Should Not Be Allowed 
to Participate in the Crowdfunded Device’s Clinical Trials
The intricate details of Scanadu’s clinical trials and whether they conform to 
FDA’s IDE requirements are not clear. But for any type of device, diagnostic or not, 
significantly risky or not, an IDE is a way to get a device into the hands of consumers 
and obtain feedback during the development process legally, while still conforming 
with FDA regulations. But allowing individuals who have purchased a device through 
a crowdfunding campaign to then participate in the clinical trials for that device poses 
a different issue, one that FDA has not had to address before. 
FDA allows medical device and pharmaceutical companies to advertise clinical 
trials directly to consumers.257 “[A]dvertising that is intended to be seen or heard by 
prospective subjects to solicit their participation in a study, is not in and of itself, an 
objectionable practice.”258 FDA, however, has explicitly excluded several things from 
the definition of acceptable direct advertising, including “(1) communications intended 
to be seen or heard by health professionals . . . (2) news stories[,] and (3) publicity 
intended for other audiences, such as financial page advertisements directed toward 
prospective investors.”259 Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign is very similar in substance 
to this third prohibited item.
This prohibition against advertising clinical trials to prospective investors reflects 
FDA’s unease with mixing clinical trials with financial interests. In addition, FDA 
requires individuals involved in the clinical trials process who have a financial stake in 
the trials to fully disclose their financial interest.260 Specifically, 21 C.F.R. § 54 requires 
companies seeking approval of their medical device to disclose any financial interest 
held by clinical investigators who are conducting clinical trials for the market approval 
254 IDE Approval Process, supra note 207 (“A significant risk device presents a potential for serious 
risk to the health, safety, or welfare of a subject.”).
255 Id. (“Nonsignificant risk devices are devices that do not pose a significant risk to the human 
subjects.”).
256 21 C.F.R. § 812.2.
257 mary bernadette ott & gary yingling, food & drug admin., guide to good CliniCal praCtiCes, 
appendix iii (2013).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 21 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2014).
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application.261 FDA adopted this regulation out of concern that a financial investment 
could “affect the reliability of data submitted to FDA.”262 
FDA does not require disclosures of financial interests held by test subjects in clinical 
trials. Investigators and test subjects, admittedly, are in very different positions with 
different levels of control over the data that is produced during a clinical trial. However, 
FDA’s concern about potential bias runs deep, and 21 C.F.R. § 54 casts a wide net to 
capture any possible prejudice.263 The regulation requires that the applicant must identify 
not only every clinical investigator and their financial interest, but also “the spouse and 
each dependent child of the investigator or subinvestigator.”264 If an applicant fails to 
provide this information, FDA may refuse to file the application altogether.265 
It would be infeasible to require applicants for FDA approval to provide this 
information for every single subject of a clinical study, as thousands of individuals 
will participate.266 If only a few subjects in a clinical trial held a financial interest in 
the product, or in the sponsor of the study, it is unlikely that the data would be skewed. 
This assurance of impartiality begins to disappear, however, when large percentages 
of the subjects have an interest. This could be the result if the subjects are obtained 
through a crowdfunding campaign.
Considering the expansive scope of the disclosures FDA requires clinical investigators 
to make, it seems FDA wants to quash any chance of bias. Although the bias of the 
crowdfunder who is a subject in a clinical trial may be small, it is at least considerable 
enough that crowdfunders that have backed a medical device should be prevented from 
participating in the clinical trials. Many different things motivate individuals in their 
decision to contribute to a crowdfunding campaign.267 In the context of the pre-purchase 
model, many backers are motivated to contribute because they will receive a product in 
return for their contribution.268 Many funders are also motivated, however, to contribute 
to “ideas and businesses [they] believe in.”269 
The contributors to the Scanadu Scout campaign were not given the option to 
participate in the clinical trials until after they had received the Scout.270 At that point, 
the decision to support Scanadu’s work was no longer motivated by the desire to 
261 food & drug admin., guidanCe for CliniCal investigators, industry, and fda staff: 
finanCial disClosure by CliniCal investigators 1 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM341008.pdf (“The Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators 
regulation (21 CFR part 54) requires applicants who submit a marketing application for a drug, biological 
product or device to submit certain information concerning the compensation to, and financial interests and 
arrangements of, any clinical investigator conducting clinical studies covered by the regulation.”).
262 Id. at 2.
263 See id.
264 Id. at 2.
265 Id. at 4. 
266 A clinical trial consists of multiple phases, with an increasing number of test subjects at each stage. 
Phase 1 will test 20–80 individuals, phase 2 will test 100–300 individuals, and phase 3 will test 1,000–3,000 
individuals. Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, food & drug admin., http://www.
fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143531.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2014).
267 See Elizabeth M. Gerber, Julie S. Hui & Pei-Yi Kuo, Crowdfunding: Why People Are Motivated to 
Post and Fund Projects on Crowdfunding Platforms (2012), available at http://www.juliehui.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/CSCW_Crowdfunding_Final.pdf; Michel Harms, What Drives Motivation to Participate 
Financially in a Crowdfunding Community? (July 13, 2007) (unpublished master thesis, VrijeUniversitaet 
Amsterdam), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269242.
268 Jonathan Sandlund, Crowdfunding Motivations—What Drives People to Invest?, tHeCrowdCafe 
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/crowdfunding-motivations/.
269 Id. 
270 Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
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receive the product. The contributors opting into the trials were motivated by something 
else, perhaps the desire to see the company and the product succeed. A crowdfunding 
campaign contributor is very similar to an investor. In the case of a medical device, the 
device will not be made available to the public at large unless the device is successful 
in the clinical trials. Contributors opting to be test subjects could be motivated by the 
desire to see the product reach the shelves or the desire to know that they made a good 
investment. 
While the motivation of backers is unclear, the chance for prejudice is certain. To avoid 
this possibility, FDA should not allow medical device or pharmaceutical companies to 
solicit clinical trial subjects through a crowdfunding campaign. There are many other 
methods of direct advertising a company can use to obtain participants, so this policy 
should not create an unfair burden.
V. enfoRCement
Crowdfunding is an effective strategy for raising capital and device companies should 
be able to use it, with some restrictions. Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign for the Scout 
highlights some of the areas where crowdfunding is at odds with FDA regulations. By 
making the Scout available to consumers before FDA cleared it, Scanadu violated an 
essential FDA regulation. If FDA does nothing to enforce the regulation, it will set a 
precedent whereby other companies will try to follow the Scanadu crowdfunding model, 
putting more consumers at risk. 
FDA needs to review the risks posed by the pre-purchase crowdfunding campaign 
model and issue guidance to help companies comply with the regulations while still 
allowing them to take advantage of the benefits of crowdfunding. At the heart of these 
guidelines should be the option for device companies to “pre-sell” their device if the 
company makes it clear to contributors that they will not receive the product unless 
FDA has fully approved it. This is the strategy Biosense used.271 This solution allows 
companies to benefit from the most popular and effective crowdfunding model, the pre-
purchase model, while ensuring that consumers are not purchasing adulterated devices. 
In addition, FDA should prohibit device companies from giving backers the option 
to participate in clinical trials as a “perk.” Allowing the overlap of these two groups 
creates a moral hazard that may ultimately affect the safety and efficacy of the device. 
Considering the large number of clinical trial subjects, it would be infeasible to mitigate 
the potential bias that might result if this was allowed. Thus, it should not be an option 
at all. 
Finally, FDA should promulgate a regulation that prevents CF platforms from allowing 
medical devices to be crowdfunded using a pre-purchase model without following 
the applicable FDA guidelines. CF platforms differ widely in their policies about 
crowdfunding medical devices.272 Under the proposed regulation, sites like Indiegogo 
would have to carefully screen companies looking to crowdfund a medical device. 
FDA has limited resources to police market activities like crowdfunding campaigns. 
By adopting regulations that impart liability on CF platforms, FDA will gain an ally in 
its effort to protect consumers. 
CF platforms are not experts in FDA regulations, but their ability to screen unlawful 
campaigns is evidenced by their detailed terms and conditions. If need be, crowdfunding 
271 See supra Part IV.A.3.
272 For example, Kickstarter does not allow anyone to use its site to fund the development of a medical 
product. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. Indiegogo, on the other hand, permits many medical 
device companies to use its platform. See supra Part II.B.
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websites could charge medical device companies a higher percentage of the funds raised 
in their campaigns to pay for the extra level of review.273 This regulation will help keep 
device companies and crowdfunding websites cognizant of, and accountable for, the 
potential risks created when medical devices are made available to consumers before 
they have been properly tested. These regulations could lead all-purpose CF platforms 
to forbid medical device companies from using their services. This will force device 
companies wishing to utilize crowdfunding to do so via their own websites, or through 
healthcare-specific CF platforms that, because of their focus, will be better equipped 
to screen unlawful campaigns.
Vi. ConCLUsion
FDA’s mission is both to protect consumers and advance innovation. If properly 
regulated, crowdfunding could help achieve both of these goals. While there has 
been a drop in medical device investment, companies in all sectors are increasingly 
using crowdfunding as a means to raise start-up capital. Thus, if used appropriately, 
crowdfunding could bring a new wave of investment to the medical device industry. 
Using Scanadu as an example, this Article has shown that crowdfunding medical 
devices can pose a host of regulatory issues that FDA needs to be aware of. Medical 
device companies should be able to use the pre-purchase model, but should not be 
able to ship a device to consumers before FDA has approved it. The Scout seems like a 
relatively harmless device, but by requiring all new devices to receive approval, FDA can 
help ensure the continued safety of consumers. In addition, medical device companies 
should not be able to obtain their clinical trial participants through their crowdfunding 
campaign. Clinical trials are an important step in gaining FDA approval, but their power 
lies in providing untainted data on the safety and efficacy of a device. To maintain the 
purity of clinical studies, FDA should disallow those who have a conflict of interest, 
like crowdfunding campaign contributors, from being test subjects. In this way, FDA 
can stimulate investment and innovation in the medical device field while continuing 
to protect consumers. 
273 For example, Indiegogo collects four percent of the total amount raised if a crowdfunder exceeds 
its goal; if the crowdfunder does not meet its goal Indiegogo collects nine percent of the total amount raised. 
Fees and Pricing, indiegogo, http://support.indiegogo.com/entries/20492953-fees-pricing (last visited Feb. 
18, 2015).
